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In this paper we study the interplay between epidemic spreading and risk perception on multiplex
networks. The basic idea is that the effective infection probability is affected by the perception of
the risk of being infected, which we assume to be related to the fraction of infected neighbours,
as introduced by Bagnoli et al., PRE 76:061904 (2007). We re-derive previous results using a self-
organized method, that automatically gives the percolation threshold in just one simulation. We
then extend the model to multiplex networks considering that people get infected by contacts in real
life but often gather information from an information networks, that may be quite different from
the real ones. The similarity between the real and information networks determine the possibility of
stopping the infection for a sufficiently high precaution level: if the networks are too different there
is no mean of avoiding the epidemics.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 64.60.aq
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Health magazine reported “Although
H1N1 influenza killed more than 4,000 people in the
United States in 2009-2010, this outbreak was relatively
mild compared to some flu pandemics” [1].
Indeed, the twentieth century was characterized by
a series of more serious events. During the 1918-19
the world assisted to the so-called Spanish Flu. Start-
ing from three different places: Brest (France), Boston
(Massachusetts) and Freetown (Sierra Leone), the disease
spread worldwide, killing 25 million people in 6 months
(about 17 million in India, 500,000 in the United States
and 200,000 in the United Kingdom).
In 1957, another pandemic originated in China and
spread rapidly in Southeast Asia, taking hence the name
of Asian. The virus responsible was identified in the sub-
type H2N2, new to humans, resulting from a previous
human H1N1 virus that was remixed with a duck virus
from which it received the genes encoding the H2 and
N2. This pandemic took eight months to travel world-
wide and caused one to two million victims.
The 1968 pandemic was the mildest of the twentieth
century and started once again in China. From there it
spread to Hong Kong, where more than half a million
people fell ill, and in the same year reached the United
States and the rest of the world.
Given these facts (and the whole records of pandemics
in history [2]), it is not surprising that the public health
∗ emassaro@andrew.cmu.edu
† franco.bagnoli@unifi.it
organizations are concerned about the appearance of a
new deadly pandemics.
However, in recent decades there have been many cases
of false or exaggerated information about epidemics. One
example if the Swine flu of 1976, or the Avian flu in 1997
where a United Nations health official warned that the
virus could kill up to 150 million worldwide [1] or the
more recent 2009 H1N1 flu, during whose outbreak the
U.K. Department of Health warned about 65000 possible
deaths as reported by the Daily Mail in 2010 [3]. Fortu-
nately these fears did not realize.
These catastrophic scenarios and the extent of their
impacts on the economic and social contexts induce a re-
flection on the method used to forecast the evolution of a
disease in real world. It is well known that in deeply con-
nected networks (and in particular in scale-free ones with-
out strong compartmentalization) the epidemic threshold
of standard epidemic modeling is vanishing [4–8]. Indeed,
the lazzarettos [9] experience first in Venice and then in
many ports and cities was so successful in the absence
of effective treatments because it was able to break the
contact network. Indeed, the pest was last observed in
Venice in 1630, whereas in southeastern Europe, it was
present until the 19th century [10].
However, the last deadly pandemics of pest in Europe
happened in 1820 [2], and worldwide in Vietnam in the
60’s; the last pandemic influenza, Hong Kong flu, in 1968-
1969. In other words, the last rapid deadly pandemics
happened well before the appearance of highly-connected
human networks.
Clearly, the public health systems put a lot of efforts in
trying to make people aware of the dangers connected to
hygiene, dangerous sexual habits and so on. Indeed, the
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2current worldwide diffusion of large-scale diseases (HIV,
seasonal influenza, cold, papilloma virus, herpes virus,
viral hepatitis among others) is deeply related to their
silent (and slow) progression or to the assumption (possi-
bly erroneous) or their harmlessness. However, it is well
known that the direct experience (contact with actual
ill people) is much more influential than public exhorta-
tions.
Therefore, in order to accurately modeling the spread-
ing of a disease in human societies, we need to take into
account the perception of its impacts and the consequent
precautions that people take when they become aware of
an epidemic. These precautions may consist in changes
in personal habits, vaccination or modifications of the
contact network.
We are here interested in diseases for which no vacci-
nation is possible, so that the only way of avoiding a pan-
demic is by means of an appropriate level of precautions,
in order to lower the infection rate below the epidemic
threshold. We also assume that there is no acquired im-
munity from the disease and that its consequences are
sufficiently mild not to induce a radical change in social
contacts.
In a previous work [11], some of us investigated the in-
fluence of the risk perception in epidemic spreading. We
assumed that the knowledge about the diffusion of the
disease among neighbors (without knowing who is actu-
ally infected) effectively lowers the probability of trans-
mission (the effective infectiousness). We studied the
worst case of an infection on a scale-free network with
exponent γ = 2 and we showed that in this case no de-
gree of prevention is able to stop the infection and one
has to take additional precaution for hubs (such as public
officers and physicians).
We extend here the investigation to different network
structures, on order to obtain a complete reference frame.
For regular, random, Watts-Strogatz small-world and
non-assortative scale-free networks with exponent γ > 3
there is always a finite level of precaution parameter for
which the epidemics go extinct. For scale-free networks
with γ < 3 the precaution level depends on the cutoff
of the power-law, which at least depends on the finite
number of the network.
We consider then an important factor of modern so-
ciety: the fact that most of information comes no more
from physical contacts nor from broadcasting media, but
rather from the “virtual” social contact networks [12–14].
A recent study, State of the news media for the United
States [15], highlights this phenomena. It shows the ex-
tent of the influence of social networks, for what concerns
subscribers who can read news published by newspapers.
The 9% of the population claims to inquire “very often”
through Facebook and Twitter and seven out of ten mem-
bers are addressed to articles (from newspapers and other
sources) by friends and family members.
We are therefore confronted with news coming mainly
from an information network. On the other hand, the
real network of contacts is the environment where ac-
tual infections occur. We extend our model to the case
in which the source of information (mixed real and vir-
tual contacts) does not coincide with the actual source
of infection (the real contacts).
This system is well represented as a multiplex net-
work [16–20], i.e., a graph composed by several layers
in which the same set of N nodes can be connected to
each other by means of links belonging to different layers,
which represents a specific case of interdependent net-
work [21, 22]. Recently, Granell et al. [23] have pointed
out the attention to an interesting scenario where the
multiplex corresponds to a two-layers network, one where
the dynamics of the awareness about the disease (the in-
formation dynamics) evolves and another where the epi-
demic process spreads. They have also investigated the
effect of mass media when all the agents are aware of the
infection [24] which is the best case for stopping the epi-
demic. However, here we are interested in the studying a
case of neglected diseases in which the probability to be
aware of the disease is very low (and not advertised by
mass-media).
The first layer represents the information network
where people become aware of the epidemic thanks to
news coming from virtual and real contacts in various
proportions. The second layer represents the real con-
tact network where the epidemic spreading takes place.
In this paper we want to model the effect of the virtual
information for simulating the awareness of the agents in
the real-world network contacts. We study how the per-
colation threshold of a susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) dynamics depends on the perception of the risk
(that affects the infectivity probability) when this infor-
mation comes from the same contact network of the dis-
ease or from a different network. In other words, we
study the interplay between risk perception and disease
spreading on multiplex networks.
We are interested in the epidemic threshold, which is
a quantity that it is not easy to obtain automatically
(for different values of the parameters) using numerical
simulations. We extend a self-organized formulation of
percolation phenomena [25] that allows to obtain this
threshold in just one simulation (for a sufficiently large
system).
II. THE NETWORK MODEL
In this section we show our method for generating mul-
tiplex networks. First of all we describe the mechanisms
for generating regular, random and scale-free networks.
Let us denote by aij = 0, 1 the adjacency matrix of the
network, aij = 1 if there is a link from j to i and zero
otherwise. We shall denote by ki =
∑
j aij the connectiv-
ity of site i and by j
(i)
1 , j
(i)
2 , . . . , j
(i)
ki
that of its neighbours
(a
i,j
(i)
n
= 1). We shall consider only symmetric networks.
We generate networks with N nodes and 2mN links, so
that the average connectivity of each node is 〈k〉 = 2m.
3FIG. 1. Example of multiplexes generated with our method
where (a) Rnet and (b) Gnet are both networks with N =
20 nodes and 〈k〉 = 4. (c) Multiplex networks where the
information network (Vnet) is given by the mixing of (a) and
(b) with pr = 0.5.
• Regular 1D: Nodes are arranged on a ring (periodic
boundary condition). Any given node establishes
a link with the m closest nodes at its right. For
instance for m = 2, node 1 establishes a link with
nodes 2 and 3, node 2 with nodes 3 and 4, and so
on until node N − 1 establishes links with nodes N
and 1 and node N with nodes 1 and 2.
• Random: Any node establishes m links with ran-
domly chosen nodes, avoiding self-loops and mul-
tiple links. The probability distribution of ran-
dom networks is Possonian, P (k) = z
ke−z
k! , where
z = 〈k〉.
• Scale-free: we use a configurational model fixing
also a cutoff K. First, at each node i out of N is
assigned a connectivity ki draft from a power-law
distribution P (k) = Ak−γ , m ≤ k ≤ K, with A =
(γ − 1)/(m1−γ −K1−γ). Then links are connected
at random avoiding self-loops and multiple links,
and finally the total number of link is pruned in
order to adjust the total number of links. This
mechanism allow us to generate scale-free networks
with a given exponent γ.
We are interested in multiplex networks composed by
two sub-networks that we denote real and information.
We generate freely the real network by choosing one from
regular, random or scale-free. Then we generate a virtual
network also chosen from the three benchmark networks,
with same average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m. In order to
construct the information network we overlap the real
and the virtual ones and then, for each node, we prune
its “real” links with probability q and its “virtual” ones
with probability 1− q. The overlap between the real and
the information networks is thus 1− q. The information
network is not symmetric.
This procedure allow us to study the effects of the dif-
ference between the real network, where the epidemic
spreading takes place, and the information one, where
actors become aware of the disease, i.e., over which they
!
"#
!
"$
!
"%
!
"&
!
"'
!
"(
!
"&
!
"(
!
")
!
"(
!
")
!
"*
!
")
!
"*
!
"+
!
"$
!
"'
!
"$
!
"%
!
"#
!
"*
!
"*
,
-.
/
0123/456/789264:/;<=6>4>?$@
! ! ! ! ! ! !
!") !"$ !"% !"# !"* !"$
!"( !"$ !"$ !"* !"*
A:4;B/4C-6D;4D;/14
1/63=92;-=:4=33=86D
233=6E-:74;=4;B/4.-:-.8.
=C4-:3=.-:749-:>D
F;4;-./4G/6=42994D-;/D426/4-:C/3;/E4C=6429941
H=64;B/4C=99=<-:74D;/1D4=:/4;2>/D4;B/4.-:-.8.42.=:74
29;/6:2;-I/412;BDJ4<B-3B426/4B=</I/64E=.-:2;/E4KL4;B/4
.2M-.8.4K/;<//:416/I-=8D4;B6/DB=9E42:E4;B/462:E=.4
:8.K/646/92;/E4;=4;B/49-:>"
FIG. 2. Evolution of the local minimum value of the perco-
lation parameter pi for a 1D regular network with k = 2.
evaluate the perception of the risk of being infected. An
example of multiplex is reported in Fig. 1.
III. INFECTION MODEL AND MEAN-FIELD
APPROXIMATION
Following Ref. [11], we assume that the probability
that a site i is infected by a neighbour j is given by
u(s, k) = τ exp
(
−J s
ki
)
,
where τ is the “bare” infection probability and s is the
number of infected neighbours. The idea is that the per-
ception of the risk, given by the percentage of infected
neighbours and modulated by the factor J , effectively
lowers the infection probability (for instance because peo-
ple takes more precautions). In the case of information
networks, the perception is computed on the mixed real-
virtual neighbourhood, while the actual infection process
takes places on the real network.
It is possible to derive a simple mean-field approxima-
tion for the fixed-k case. Denoting by c the fraction of
infected individuals at time t and by c′ those at time t+1,
we have, considering a random network,
c′ =
k∑
s=0
(
k
s
)
cs(1− c)k−sp(s, k), (1)
where p(s, k) is the probability of being infected if there
are s out of k infected neighbours. The probability p
depends on u as
p(s, k) = 1−[1− u(s, k)]s,
since the infection processes are independent, al-
though the infection probabilities are coupled by the
“perception”-dependent infection probability q, Eq. (11).
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FIG. 3. Asymptotic number of infected individuals c ver-
sus the bare infection probability τ for the SIS dynamics for
different networks, N = 10000.
Near the threshold, the probability u is small, and
therefore we can approximate
p(s, k) ' su(s, k) = sτ exp
(
−J s
k
)
.
Replacing p into Eq. (1), we get
c′ =
k∑
s=0
(
k
s
)
cs(1− c)k−ssτ exp
(
−J s
k
)
,
and setting a = exp (−Js/k),
c′ = τ
k∑
s=0
(
k
s
)
cs(1− c)k−ssas,
which gives
c′ = τak(ca+ 1− c)k−1.
The critical threshold Jc corresponds to the stationary
state c′ = c in the limit c→ 0, i.e.,
τ =
1
k
exp
(
Jc
k
)
; Jc = k ln(kτ). (2)
This prediction is quite accurate: in Fig. 5 the compar-
ison between Eq. (2) and actual simulations in reported
for different values of 〈k〉 using random networks.
The analysis can be extended to non-homogeneous net-
works with connectivity distribution P (k) like the scale-
free ones. We can start analysing a node with connectiv-
ity k
c′k =
1∑
s1,s2,...,sk=0
∞∑
j1,j2,...,jk=0
k∏
i=1
C(ji, k)I(si, ji)T (k|si),
where we denote with i = 1, . . . , k the neighbours, si =
0, 1 is their state (healthy, infected) and ji their connec-
tivity. C(j, k) is the probability that a node with connec-
tivity j is attached to node with connectivity k, I(si, ji)
is the probability that the neighbour i is infected, and
T (k|si) is the probability that it transmits the infection
to the node under investigation.
Clearly,
∑
j C(j, k) = 1. We use symmetric networks,
so jC(j, k)P (j) = kC(k, j)Pk (detailed balance). For
non-assortative networks, C(j, k) does not depend on
k, and summing over the detailed balance condition,
C(j, k) = jP (j)/〈k〉. The quantity I(si, ji) is simply
csiji (1 − cji)1−si and T (k|si) = 1 − (1 − τ exp(−Js/k))s,
where s =
∑
i si (risk perception). Near the extinc-
tion, τ exp(−Js/k) is small and we can approximate
T (k|si) = sτ exp(−Js/k).
Summing up, we have
c′k =
1∑
s1,s2,...,sk=0
∞∑
j1,j2,...,jk=0
k∏
i=1
jiP (ji)
〈k〉 c
si
ji
(1− cji)1−sisτ exp
(
−J s
k
)
,
=
1∑
s1,s2,...,sk=0
sτ exp
(
−J s
k
) k∏
i=1
∞∑
ji=0
jiP (ji)
〈k〉 c
si
ji
(1− cji)1−si .
Since si = 0, 1, the quantity c
si
ji
(1 − cji)1−si is either si
or 1− si. Let us define c˜ =
∑
j jcj/〈k〉, and we get
c′k =
1∑
s1,s2,...,sk=0
sτ exp
(
−J s
k
) k∏
i=1
c˜si(1− c˜)1−si ,
=
k∑
s=0
(
k
s
)
sτ exp
(
−J s
k
)
c˜s(1− c˜)k−s,
i.e.,
c′k = c˜kτ exp
(−Js
k
)(
c˜ exp
(
−J
k
)
+ 1− c˜
)
.
Near the epidemic threshold c˜→ 0, and
c˜′ =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kc′kP (k) =
τ c˜
〈k〉
∑
k
k2P (k) exp
(
−J
k
)
.
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FIG. 4. Comparison between the results of the mean field
approximation and simulations for three instances of scale-
free networks with γ = 2.4, N = 10000, m = 2 and K = 300.
Although the simulations give similar results, the mean-field
computations (that coincide with the simulation only for Jc =
0) are very dependent on the details of the network.
.
The correspondence between τc and Jc is therefore
τc(Jc) =
〈k〉∑
k k
2P (k) exp
(−Jck ) , (3)
which, for Jc = 0, gives the usual relationship τc =
〈k〉/〈k2〉, that for a sharply peaked P (k) corresponds to
Eq. (2).
By using a continuous approximation, it is possible to
make explicit the relationship between τ and Jc in the
scale-free case. Eq. (3) becomes
τc(Jc) =
〈k〉∫K
m
k2P (k) exp
(−Jck ) dk , (4)
Substituting, for the scale free case, P (k) = Ak−γ ,
where A is the normalization constant so that
∫K
m
P (k) =
1
A =
γ − 1
m1−γ −K1−γ ' (γ − 1)m
γ−1,
if K  m (and γ < 3). We get
〈k〉 = γ − 1
γ − 2 ·
m2−γ −K2−γ
m1−γ −K1−γ '
γ − 1
γ − 2m
for K  m, and
τc(Jc) = J
3−γ
c
[
Γ
(
γ − 3, Jc
K
)
− Γ
(
γ − 3, Jc
m
)]
, (5)
where Γ(a, x) is the incomplete gamma function. Eq. (5)
diverges for K →∞ and thus for infinite networks Jc = 0
∀τ . However, real networks always have a cut-off (at least
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FIG. 5. Comparison between mean field approximation and
simulations for random networks with different values of 〈k〉.
due to the finite number of nodes) [26]. For Jc = 0 we
recover the standard threshold
τc(0) =
γ − 3
γ − 2 ·
m2−γ −K2−γ
m3−γ −K3−γ '
3− γ
γ − 2 ·
m2−γ
K3−γ
. (6)
The problem of epidemic threshold in finite-size scale-
free networks was studied in Ref. [27]. The conclusions
there is that even in finite-size networks the epidemics is
hard to stop. Indeed, we find numerically that the epi-
demics always stops in finite scale-free networks although
the required critical value of Jc may be quite large.
In Fig. 4 the comparison between the mean-field pre-
diction, Eq. (3), and actual simulations is shown, for
three instances of a scale-free network generated with
the same parameters. The theoretical prediction coin-
cides with the simulations only for Jc = 0. Moreover,
although the simulation results seems to be sufficiently
independent on the details of the generated networks, the
theoretical prediction is quite sensible to them. The con-
tinuous approximation, Eq. (6) gives, form = 2, K = 300
and γ = 2.4, a value τ(0) ' 0.037, quite different from
the computed one τ(0) ' 0.08.
IV. THE SELF-ORGANIZED PERCOLATION
METHOD
Here we show a self-organized percolation method that
allows to obtain the critical value of the percolation pa-
rameter in a single run, for a given network. We consider
a parallel SIS process, which is equivalent to a directed
percolation problem where the directed direction is time.
Let us denote by xi(t) = 0, 1 (0 =healthy, 1 =infected),
the percolating variable and by p the control parameter
(percolation probability).
6A. Simple infection (direct percolation)
Considering the infection probability τ is fixed, the
stochastic evolution process for the network is defined as
xi(t+ 1) =
∨
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[τ > rij(t)]xj(t) (7)
where
∨
represents the OR operator and the multiplica-
tion represents the AND. The square bracket represents
the truth function, [·] = 1 if “·” is true, and zero other-
wise. The quantity rij(t) is a random number between
0 and 1 that varies with i, j and t. We want to de-
rive an equation for τi(t), which is the minimum value
of τ for which xi(t) is infected. We can replace xi(t) by
[τ > τi(t)]. Eq. (7) becomes:
[τ > τi(t+ 1)] =
∨
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[τ > rij(t)][τ > τj(t)]. (8)
Now [τ > a][τ > b] is equal to [τ > max(a, b)] and [τ >
a] ∨ [τ > b] is equal to [τ > min(a, b)], therefore Eq. (8)
becomes:
[τ > τi(t+1)] =
[
τ >
(
MAX
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
max
(
rij(t), τj(t)
))]
,
(9)
and therefore we get the equations for the τi’s
τi(t+ 1) = MIN
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
max
(
rij(t), τj(t)
)
. (10)
Let assume that at time t = 0 all sites are infected, so
that xi(0) = 1 ∀τ . We can alternatively write τi(0) = 0
(since the minimum value of τ for which xi(0) = 1 is
one for sure. We can therefore iterate Eq. (10) and get
the asymptotic distribution of τi. The minimum of this
distribution gives the critical value τc for which there is at
least one percolating cluster with at least one “infected”
site at large times. As usual, t cannot be infinitely large
for finite N otherwise there will be surely a fluctuation
that will bring the system into the absorbing (healthy
xi = 0) configuration. A schematic representation of this
modus operandi is illustrated in Fig. 2.
B. Infection with risk perception
Now, let us apply the method to a more difficult prob-
lem, for which the percolation probability depends on the
fraction of infected sites in the neighbourhood (risk per-
ception). As above, we define the infection probability u
as
u(s, k) = τ exp
(
−J · s
k
)
(11)
where τ is the bare infection probability, s is the num-
ber of infected neighbors and k is the node connectiv-
ity. In this case we want to find the minimum value
of the parameter J for which there is no spreading of
the infection at large times. The quantity [u > r] =
[τ exp(−Js/k) > r] is equivalent to [J < −(k/s) ln(r/τ)].
Therefore Eq. (8) is replaced by
[J < Ji(t+ 1)] =
∨
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[
J < −ki
si
ln
(
rij(t)
τ
)]
[J < Jj(t)] (12)
where
si ≡ si(J) =
∑
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
xj =
∑
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[Jj(t) ≥ J ]. (13)
So
[J < Ji(t+ 1)] =
∨
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[
J < − ki
si(Jj(t))
ln
(
rij(t)
τ
)]
[J < Jj(t)] (14)
and therefore
Ji(t+ 1) = MAX
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
min
(
− ki
si(Jj(t))
ln
(
rij(t)
τ
)
, Jj(t)
)
. (15)
Analogously to the previous case, the critical value of Jc
is obtained by taking the maximum value of the Ji(t) for
some large (but finite) value of t.
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FIG. 6. Critical precaution threshold Jc (color code) as a
function of the bare infection τ and of the difference between
the real and the information network q. Here the real and
virtual networks are Poissonian (random) with 〈k〉 = 6 and
N = 1000. In the darker region there is always a value of
Jc able to stop the epidemics, while in the lighter region the
epidemics cannot be stopped. The separation boundary is the
stoppability frontier.
C. The self-organized percolation method for
multiplex networks
We can now turn to the problem of computing the
critical value Jc for a fixed value of τ if the perception
is computed on the information network which is par-
tially different from the “real” where infection spreads.
Here the perception of the importance of the infection,
si, is computed on the neighbours j
(i)
on the information
network. The perceived number of infected neighbours
depends on how many of them, in the information net-
work, have a valueJj larger than that computed in the
real network, i.e.,
Ji(t+1) = MAX
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
min
(
− ki
si(Jj)
ln
(
rij(t)
τ
)
, Jj(t)
)
,
(16)
where
si(J) =
∑
j=j
(i)
1 ,...,j
(i)
ki
[Jj ≥ J ]. (17)
In other words: for any value of J in the real neigh-
bourhood one computes how many neighbours j in the
information network have Jj ≥ J . This is the perceived
value of the risk.
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FIG. 7. Critical precaution threshold Jc versus the difference
between the real and the information network q for some val-
ues of the bare infection τ(from right to left τ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
Random real network and scale-free virtual network, both
with 〈k〉 = 6, N = 10000.
V. RESULTS
In this section we show the results of the self-organized
percolation method in both single-layered and multiplex
networks (with and without risk perception). For our
experiments we generally use the network size N = 10000
and the computational time T = 10000.
A. Percolation in single-layered networks (SIS
dynamics)
We investigated the SIS dynamics over regular, Poisson
and scale-free networks as shown in Fig. 3. In particular
we evaluated the critical epidemic threshold values τc for
which there is at least one percolating clusters with at
least one infected nodes.
Considering a regular lattice with connectivity degree
k = 2, we found τc ' 0.6447 which is compatible with the
results of the bond percolation transition in the Domany-
Kinzel model [28].
In the case of random networks with Poisson de-
gree distributions the critical epidemic threshold τc =
〈k〉/〈k2〉 ' 〈k〉−1 if the distribution is sharp [5]. Indeed,
for Poisson network with 〈k〉 = 12 the self-organized per-
colation method gives τc ' 0.08 ' 1/12.
For a scale-free network with 〈k〉 = 13.95 and 〈k2〉 =
538.5 we get from simulations τc ' 0.026, in agreement
with the expected value.
B. The effects of risk perception in SIS dynamics
We investigate the effects of risk perception in the pre-
vious simple model of epidemic spreading. The results
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FIG. 8. Critical precaution threshold Jc versus the dif-
ference between the real and the information network q for
some values of the bare infection τ (from right to left: τ =
0.2, 0.3, . . . , 0.6). Random real and virtual networks, both
with 〈k〉 = 6 and N = 10000.
are quite interesting if compared with the simple SIS dy-
namics (Fig. 3) by inserting the risk perception it is possi-
ble to stop the epidemic for every value of the bare infec-
tion probability τ up to τ = 1. let us consider for instance
the case of random networks with 〈k〉 = 6. For the sim-
ple infection process we found a critical value τc = 0.165
(Fig. 3). As shown in Fig. 5, beyond this value of τc the
epidemics can still be stopped if all agents adopt a suffi-
ciently high precaution level J . The same consideration
can be done also for the other scenarios.
C. Multiplex risk perception
The phase diagram for the risk-perception over SIS dy-
namics in multiplex networks is reported in Fig. 6. The
general shape of this phase diagram can be understood
considering that a given node of real connectivity kr is
connected, in the information network, to (1− q)kr real
neighbours, the rest being virtual ones. At the thresh-
old, the global fraction of infected sites is small. For the
spreading of the epidemics, the important sites are those
that have a infected real neighbour. It might be assumed
that the virtual neighbours, being uncorrelated with the
real ones, do not contribute at all to the risk perception.
Among the real neighbours, the fraction qkr replaced by
virtual ones has become invisible, and so the perception
decreases by a factor q. For a given value of the percep-
tion, the infection is stoppable only if the infectiousness
is also decreased by a factor q. Indeed, the shape of the
stoppability frontier of Fig. 6 resembles that of an hyper-
bola τq = const.
The general trend is that, increasing the difference q
between the information network and the real one it be-
comes harder to stop an epidemics. It is interesting to
investigate this transition. As we can see in Fig. 7 for a
real random and ghost scale-free network, this transition
is quite sharp, especially for low values of τ . A similar
scenario holds for a mixture of real and ghost random
networks, as shown in Fig. 8.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the interplay between epidemic
spreading and risk perception on multiplex networks, ex-
ploiting mean-field approximations and a self-organized
method, that automatically gives the percolation thresh-
old in just one simulation. We focused on multiplex net-
works, considering that people get infected by contacts in
real life but often gather information from an information
networks, that may be quite different from the real ones.
The main conclusion is that the similarity between the
real and information networks determine the possibility
of stopping the infection for a sufficiently high precaution
level: if the networks are too different there is no mean
of avoiding the epidemics. Moreover, especially for low
values of the bare infection probability, this transition
occurs sharply without evident forerunners. This last
observation remarks that, although the virtual world has
indeed the advantage of allowing a fast diffusion of infor-
mation, real epidemics still propagate in the real world.
This is of particular importance for “neglected” diseases,
possibly diffused in marginalized parts of the population
that have little access to Internet, and that in any case
are not part of the “neighbourhood” of “real neighbours”
belonging to other social classes.
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